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1. INTRODUCTION 
This article will use the principles of subsidiarity, solidarity and the 
common good to analyze the extent to which some specific aspects of the 
environmental statutory and regulatory regimes in the United States are 
"rightly ordered." Specifically, this article will look at aspects of two differ-
. ent environmental regulatory systems-the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Ad (RCRA) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response 
Compensation and Liability Act2 (CERCLA)-to evaluate whether princi-
ples of subsidiarity, solidarity and the common good suggest that the locus 
of regulation and enforcement makes sense as presently structured. 
Section II begins with an outline of subsidiarity, solidarity and the 
common good and evaluates these principles in contrast to considerations of 
economics and political science, which are more frequently used within sec-
ular discussions of the need for, and appropriate locus of, environmental 
regulation.3 Section III then analyzes how these principles apply to RCRA 
and CERCLA: first, the section suggests that RCRA is largely "rightly or-
dered" in terms of being a regulatory system in which regulation is de-
signed and promulgated at the federal level, implemented and enforced at 
the state level, and considered by individual businesses when deciding upon 
manufacturing processes that may (or may not) generate hazardous wastes 
subject to regulation;4 second, the section suggests that in contrast to 
RCRA, CERCLA is a regulatory system inappropriately ordered toward 
federal control (at least in part) when state or local control might be more 
appropriate.s In conclusion, Section IV contains a brief discussion of how 
the principles of subsidiarity; solidarity and the common good might pro-
vide a useful methodology for evaluating other environmental regulatory 
regimes.6 
II. UNDERSTANDING SUBSIDIARITY, SOLIDARITY AND THE 
COMMON GOOD 
In Quadragesimo Anno, Pope Pius XI set forth the principle of sub-
sidiarity by stating: 
1. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6922k (West 2008). 
2. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 2008). 
3. See infra notes 7-19 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 20-65 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 66-98 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra note 98 and accompanying text. 
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Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can 
accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the 
community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time a grave 
evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and 
higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can 
do. For every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish 
help to the members of the body social, and never destroy and 
absorb them.7 
Because subsidiarity suggests that social activity should help the "members 
of the body social," the principle of subsidiarity is not so much a founda-
tional principle of Catholic Social Thought on its own as it is an instrumen-
tal principle designed to promote one of the foundational principles of 
Catholic Social Thought: the common good.8 The principle of subsidiarity 
posits that the common good is best served when decision-making regard-
ing actions and activities is delegated to the local entity-to the smallest 
organization-best able to make the decision.9 
The range of entities contemplated by Catholic Social Thought is in-
structive because Catholic Social Thought encompasses both private actors 
as well as public actors-from individuals and associations (businesses or 
communal associations) to local governments, state governments and the 
federal government. The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops in 
Economic Justice for All perhaps best described the relationship between 
these groups: 
The primary norm for determining the scope and limits of govern-
mental intervention is the "principle of subsidiarity" . . . . This 
principle states that, in order to protect basic justice, government 
should undertake only those initiatives which exceed the capaci-
ties of individuals or private groups acting independently. Gov-
ernment should not replace or destroy smaller communities and 
individual initiative. Rather it should help them contribute more 
effectively to social well-being and supplement their activity 
when the demands of justice exceed their capacities. This does 
not mean, however, that the government that governs least, gov-
erns best. Rather it defines good government intervention as that 
which truly "helps" other social groups contribute to the common 
7. Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, 'J[ 79 (May 15, 1931), available at http://www.vatican.vaJ 
holy jather/pius_xi/encyclicals/documentsIhCp-xLenc_1931 0515 _quadragesimo-anno_en.html 
(emphasis added). 
8. Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium oj the Social Doctrine oj the 
Church, 'J[ 188 (Apr. 2, 2004), available at http://www.vatican.vaJroman_curiaJpontificaCcoun-
cils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc-Justpeace_doc20060526_compendio-dott-socen.html#INTRO-
DUCTION [hereinafter Compendium] ("In any case, the common good correctly understood, the 
demands of which w~ll never in any way be contrary to the defence and promotion of the primacy 
of the person and the way this is expressed in society, must remain the criteria for making deci-
sions concerning the application of the principle of subsidiarity."). 
9. [d. 'J[ 186. 
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good by directing, urging, restraining, and regulating economic 
activity as "the occasion requires and necessity demands."l0 
265 
Because the principle of subsidiarity is ordered toward promoting the 
common good, questions of solidarity also must be considered when deter-
mining the best level of decision-making,u Solidarity is defined as: 
[N]ot a feeling of vague compassion or shallow distress at the 
misfortunes of so many people, both near and far. On the con-
trary, it is a firm and persevering determination to commit oneself 
to the common good; that is to say, to the good of all and of each 
individual, because we are all really responsible for all. 12 
Taken together, the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity direct that 
the best level of decision-making depends on each level's ability to serve 
the common good. Thus, if the decisions of individuals or private groups 
are ordered toward the common good or the "good of all" rather than 
merely toward self-interest, then the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity 
suggest that it is appropriate to leave decision-making regarding economic 
activity in the hands of individuals and private groups (without interference 
from government regulation). If, on the other hand, the decisions of individ-
uals or private groups are not ordered toward the common good but are 
ordered toward self-interest, then some governmental regulation may be 
necessary to restrain economic activity that may be harmful to the common 
goodY 
The introduction of government regulation invites the question of the 
level at which government regulation should take place: local, state or fed-
eral? An analysis similar to the test to determine the need for government 
regulation should direct the determination of the appropriate locus of deci-
sion-making and regulation. If the local governmental unit is capable of 
engaging in efficient, cost-effective regulatory activities-and is likely to 
order its decision-making toward the common good (not just the good of all 
members of the local community, but to the "good of all")-then it should 
be entrusted with regulatory authority. If the local government either is not 
equipped to engage in the regulatory activity or is not likely to order its 
decision-making toward the common good, then the state government may 
be better situated to be the locus of regulatory authority. Finally, if the state 
government either is not equipped to engage in the regulatory activity or is 
not likely to order its decision-making toward the good of all (including 
10. Office for Social Justice St. Paul and Minneapolis, Economic Justice jor All: Pastoral 
. Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy, '][ 124 (1986), http://www.osjspm.org/ 
economicjustice_focaii . 
11. Compendium, supra note 8, '][ 356. 
12. Ioannes Paulus PP. II, Solicitudo Rei Socia lis [On Social Concem), '][ 38 (Dec. 30, 1987), 
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy jather/john_pauUilencyc1icals/documentslhfjp-ii_enc_ 
30121987 _sollicitudo-rei-socialis_en.html. 
13. See Compendium, supra note 8, ']['][ 351, 354. 
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those outside the state), then the federal government may be better situated 
to be the locus of regulatory authority. 
Notably, this set of principles aligns well with some of the economic 
literature relating to the system of environmental regulation that has devel-
oped in the United States. One of the primary economic justifications for 
environmental regulation is that the economic self-interest of individuals or 
groups of people acting in concert (through a business, for example) will 
generally result in inadequate attention to environmental concerns because 
these individuals and businesses fail to act on the principle of solidarity-
they fail to make decisions based on the "good of all," focusing instead on 
their own goOd. 14 
While economic concerns justify some types of environmental regula-
tion to promote the common good, the economic analysis does not help 
much in determining the appropriate locus for such regulation, whether it is 
the local, state or federal level. Within the United States constitutional 
structure, the concept of federalism frequently provides the touchstone for 
discussing at what governmental level environmental regulation should re-
side-some authority is provided to the federal government, while some 
authority is reserved to the states-but this does not inherently suggest a 
preference for regulation at the "lowest, appropriate" level of government in 
a manner truly consistent with the concept of subsidiarity. IS Further, the 
political and legal analysis of the appropriate locus of regulation may be 
very nuanced in accounting for a variety of concepts such as human and 
14. Individuals and businesses enjoy the' economic benefits of their decisions regarding their 
actions or activities, but frequently distribute the economic costs over other actors and entities-
imposing external costs on others that are not internalized in the individual's or business's deci-
sion-making. The most famous description of this in an environmental context is The Tragedy of 
the Commons, in which Garrett Hardin describes how decision-makers in a "commons" will make 
individually rational but collectively irrational decisions because of the lack of pricing with re-
spect to collectively owned resources. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 
1243 (1968); see also Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching 
Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 
23, 29 (1996). 
15. See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European 
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 331, 403-407 (1994) (noting that the 
federalism structure within the U.S. Constitution allocates authority between the federal govern-
ment and the states, but also recognizing that this dual sovereignty system between states and the 
federal government does not necessarily describe a preference for local decision-making (even 
though more recent commentators have begun to assert such a preference)); Daniel C. Esty, Revi-
talizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REv. 570, 571 n.5 (1995) (describing different 
conceptions of federalism-one of which recognizes shared power among different levels of gov-
ernment and one of which exhibits a preference for decentralized decision-making); Erin Ryan, 
Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balances in the Interjurisdictional 
Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REv. 503, 519-20, 623-24 (2007) (discussing the dual sovereignty re-
flected in various provisions of the U.S. Constitution and noting that "new" federalism reflects a 
preference for local decision-making, but that subsidiarity adds a gloss relating to the capacity of 
the local unit to engage appropriately in addressing whatever the specific situation happens to be). 
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financial resource capacity, interjurisdictional competition,16 public choice 
theory (and other theories of regulation)17 and regulatory capture,18 each of 
which may speak to the extent to which a given governmental entity is more 
or less equipped than other governmental entities to accomplish the purpose 
behind a statutory or regulatory regime. Nonetheless, the political and legal 
analysis through the "federalism" lens never quite encompasses the com-
mon good in the same way as Catholic Social Thought. 19 
III. ANALYZING RCRA AND CERCLA THROUGH THE LENSES OF 
SUBSIDIARITY, SOLIDARITY AND THE COMMON GOOD 
The analytical structure of the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity 
can be applied to RCRA and CERCLA to determine if these statutory struc-
tures are "rightly ordered" in how they address the problems associated 
with the management, treatment, disposal and remediation of hazardous 
wastes and hazardous substances. Both statutes present interesting analyti-
cal challenges. 
RCRA and CERCLA first need to be understood in context. RCRA 
was enacted in 197620 to address prospectively the management of "solid 
waste"21 and "hazardous wastes."22 CERCLA was enacted in 1980.23 Both 
16. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?: Problems of Federalism in Mandating 
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1210-20 (1977) 
(identifying a concern about a "race to the bottom" as one of several justifications for the move-
ment toward centralized, federal environmental regulation); but see Richard L. Revesz, Rehabili-
tating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal 
Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (challenging the "race to the bottom" 
rationale as a continuing justification for centralized, federal environmental regulation); see also 
Esty, supra note 15, at 600-08 (describing both analyses and providing some critique of Revesz's 
analysis). 
17. See Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Politi-
cal Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845 (1999) (analyzing 
how public choice theory has reinforced a centralized, federal approach to environmental regula-
tion); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1998) (evaluating public choice theory, neopluralist theory, public interest 
theory and civic republican theory through the lens of the administrative process). 
18. See David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Ra-
tional Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 917, 927 nn.29-30 (2001) (describ-
ing two different theories of the concept of regulatory capture and discussing the design of 
administrative structures to minimize capture). 
19. Although it could be said that the federalism reflected in our constitutional structure was 
conceived by our founding fathers to be directed toward "the common good," this probably should 
be understood to be a narrower understanding of "the common good" than that reflected in Catho-
lic Social Thought-focused more on individual liberty for the sake of individual liberty rather 
than focusing on the individual's responsibility to promote the "flourishing of all individuals." 
20. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), Pub. L. No. 94-580,90 Stat. 
2795 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992k (West 2008». 
21. 42 U.S.c. § 6903(27) (2000). "The term 'solid waste' means any garbage, refuse, sludge 
from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and 
other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid or contained gaseous material resulting 
from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, ... but does not include solid or 
dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved materials in irrigation return flows or 
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statutory schemes were enacted in response to increasing concern about 
widespread contamination of the environment from the wastes resulting 
from a wide array of industrial processes.24 
RCRA is primarily forward-looking. In enacting RCRA, Congress de-
veloped a "cradle-to-grave" regulatory regime for managing wastes pro-
spectively that distinguished between "solid waste," which required less 
regulation (largely left to the states),25 and "hazardous waste," which re-
quired greater regulation (largely initiated by the federal government) due 
to the greater risk associated with its mismanagement.26 With respect to 
hazardous wastes, RCRA developed management standards for the facilities 
that generate hazardous wastes,27 transporters of hazardous waste,28 and fa-
cilities that treat, store or otherwise dispose29 of hazardous wastes. 
CERCLA is primarily backward-looking.30 CERCLA embraces a 
"polluter pays" philosophy designed to make sure that those parties respon-
industrial discharges which are point sources subject to permits under section 1342 of Title 33, or 
source, special nuclear, or byproduct material as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954." Id. 
The term is further defined in 40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (2008). 
22. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5). "The term 'hazardous waste' means a solid waste, or combination 
of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious 
characteristics may (A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase 
in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness, or (B) pose a substantial present or 
potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, 
or disposed of, or otherwise managed." Id. The term is further defined in 40 C.F.R. § 261.3. 
23. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 9767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 9601-9675 (West 2008». 
24. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6902 (West 2008) (describing Congressional findings in 
RCRA along with Congressional objectives in enacting RCRA); see also Jerome M. Organ, 
Supelfund and the Settlement Decision: Reflections on the Relationship Between Equity and Effi-
ciency, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1043, 1046 n.17 (1994) (describing CERCLA as a response to 
Love Canal and other significant contamination issues around the country). 
25. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (stating that "the collection and disposal of solid wastes should 
continue to be primarily the function of State, regional, and local agencies"). Part D of RCRA 
specifically focuses on state responsibility for solid waste management. 42 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 6941-6949 (West 2008). In the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, however, 
Congress responded to concerns about inadequate standards for municipal solid waste disposal 
facilities by directing the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to develop standards for such 
facilities. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, §101, 98 Stat. 
3221, 3224-25 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 6901); H.R. REp. No. 98-1133, at 80 (Conf. Rep.), re-
printed in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5651. See also Jonathan P. Meyers, Note, Confronting the 
Garbage Crisis: Increased Federal Involvement as a Means of Addressing Municipal Solid Waste 
Disposal, 79 GEO. LJ. 567, 569-73 (1991) (discussing the problems with inadequate state regula-
tion of municipal solid waste disposal). 
While RCRA is primarily a forward-looking statute, some components of RCRA, the correc-
tive action requirements and the underground storage tank provisions, do integrate a retroactive 
perspective directed toward cleaning up historical (or current) contamination. See infra note 94. 
26. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6921-693ge (West 2008); 40 C.F.R. pt. 261 (2008). 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 6922 (2000); 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.10-262.108 (2008). 
28. 42 U.S.C. § 6923 (2000); 40 C.F.R. §§ 263.10-263.31 (2008). 
29. 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (2000); 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.10-264.1202 (2008). 
30. Organ, supra note 24, at 1046 n.19 (discussing the retroactive emphasis of CERCLA). 
While CERCLA is predominantly a retroactive statute, the spill reporting obligations set forth in 
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sible for causing historical contamination bear the burden of cleaning up the 
contamination.31 To do this, CERCLA imposes strict liability32 on "poten-
tially responsible parties" (PRPs)-those who generated hazardous sub-
stances disposed of at a facility, or transported hazardous substances33 to a 
facility from which there is a release or threatened release of hazardous 
substances, along with the current owner and operator of the facility and 
anyone who owned or operated the facility during the time when hazardous 
substances were placed or released.34 
A. Application to RCRA 
This section begins with a discussion of whether the principles of sub-
sidiarity, solidarity and the common good require governmental interven-
tion to regulate hazardous waste management. Next, this section focuses on 
42 U.S.C. § 6903 (2000), in 40 C.F.R. pt. 355, apps. A, B (2008) (for extremely hazardous sub-
stances), and in 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 tbI. 302.4 (2008) (for CERCLA hazardous substances) are also 
prospective in nature. 
31. Congress enacted a statute designed to compel those parties responsible for disposal of 
hazardous substances to internalize the full cost of the disposal, some of which had been shifted to 
the public through historical disposal practices that contaminated the environment and created a 
health risk. S. REp. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1980). "By holding the factually responsible 
person liable, [CERCLA] encourages that person-whether a generator, transporter or disposer of 
hazardous substances-to eliminate as many risks as possible." [d. 
32. Organ, supra note 24, at 1046 n.20 (discussing the strict liability nature of CERCLA). 
33. A "hazardous substance" is defined as: 
[A]ny substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33 [the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act], (B) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or sub-
stance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having 
the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste 
Disposal Act ... , (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) 
any hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act, and (F) any 
imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Admin-
istrator has taken action pursuant to section 2606 of Title 15. The term does not include 
petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically 
listed or designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of 
this paragraph, and the term does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied 
natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such syn-
thetic gas). 
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14) (West 2008). EPA regulations list over seven hundred hazardous sub-
stances. 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 tbI.302.4 (2008). Though a substance may not be considered a hazard-
ous waste under RCRA, it may be considered a hazardous substance under CERCLA. Louisiana-
Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 6 F.3d 1332, 1337-40 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that Bevill Amend-
ment mining wastes, which are not hazardous wastes under RCRA, can be hazardous substances 
under CERCLA if their components otherwise satisfy one of the definitions of a hazardous sub-
stance under CERCLA), withdrawn and superseded, 24 F.3d 1565 (9th Cir. 1994) (the supersed-
ing opinion recognizes that the Bevill Amendment exempts a certain waste from RCRA regulation 
and holds that while the Bevill Amendment exception applies to a single subsection of CERCLA, 
the waste in question continues to be regulated as a hazardous substance by CERCLA); U.S. v. 
Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162,222 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (indicating that "the mere fact 
that ... mining waste may not be a hazardous waste under RCRA does not mean that it cannot be 
a 'hazardous substance' under CERCLA"). 
34. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607 (West 2008). Although the set of parties subject to liability under 
CERCLA is generally known as the Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs), this is a stunning 
misnomer because "potentially generally" means "almost always." 
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the extent to which the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity suggest that 
local, state or federal regulation seems more appropriate for the manage-
ment of hazardous wastes. Finally, the section evaluates the regulatory re-
gime of RCRA35 through the lenses of subsidiarity and solidarity. 
1. Justification for Regulation 
From the perspective of principles of subsidiarity and solidarity, the 
first question to address is whether governmental regulation is necessary for 
the subject area in question. Regarding RCRA, the question is whether indi-
viduals and businesses dealing with hazardous wastes can be trusted to 
manage the waste in a manner consistent with the principles of solidarity 
and of promoting the common good such that regulation should not be nec-
essary. The track record of many individuals and businesses around the 
country suggests that they cannot be. trusted to manage these wastes in a 
manner consistent with principles of solidarity and promoting the common 
good.36 Thus, applying principles of subsidiarity and solidarity, some type 
of regulation makes sense. Having established that government intervention 
is necessary, the next question is at which level of government should regu-
lation be implemented-the local, state or federal. 
2. Assessing the Appropriate Locus of Regulation 
a. Regulation at the Local Level 
With respect to the prospective activities of individuals and businesses 
using hazardous materials and generating hazardous wastes, would local 
governments be capable of engaging in the regulatory activity in an effi-
cient, cost-effective manner while ordering decision-making toward the 
common good? 
The local community faces a couple of problems in regulating hazard-
ous wastes. Given the complex nature of industrial processes that use haz-
ardous materials and generate hazardous wastes, and the abundance of 
wastes that are generated, local communities likely are not well-equipped to 
develop workable standards for regulating risks to protect their own re-
sidents, let alone those outside their community?7 
35. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992k (West 2008). 
36. See Esty, supra note 15, at 600-03 (discussing the evolution of the federal environmental 
regulatory regime in the 1960s and 1970s in response to the failure of states to manage environ-
mental issues adequately); Stewart, supra note 16 (discussing justifications for federal environ-
mental regulation in the 1970s); Organ, supra note 24 (discussing Congressional justification for 
enacting RCRA and CERCLA). 
37. The regulations for "hazardous wastes" in the Code of Federal Regulations take up hun-
dreds of pages. It is hard to comprehend individual communities having the resources to comply 
with this massive set of regulations. It should be fairly clear that municipalities generally lack the 
capacity to develop a complete and thorough regulatory structure for managing solid and hazard-
ous wastes, especially given the example of municipal landfills and the environmental problems 
associated with them that prompted Congress to direct the EPA to promulgate regulations in the 
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Moreover, the local community may not reliably look after the inter-
ests of those outside the community. Assuming the local government would 
like to protect its citizens from risks associated with exposure to hazardous 
wastes,38 it might appear that the interests of residents of the local commu-
nity would be largely congruent with the interests of those outside the com-
munity: any regulatory efforts designed to protect local residents such as 
storage requirements, labeling requirements, etc., would also likely protect 
those outside the community?9 However, there is one major exception that 
presents a problem-regulations may prohibit or discourage treatment, stor-
age or disposal of hazardous wastes within the local community.4o Such 
regulations would protect local residents but would do so by shifting the 
risks associated with transport, treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous 
wastes to others outside the community. 
Thus, not only are local communities not equipped to develop complex 
regulatory regimes given limited resources, but local regulation may be in-
consistent with principles of solidarity in some circumstances given that 
regulations completely prohibiting the treatment, storage and disposal of 
hazardous waste within a given community would serve the self-interest of 
that community at the expense of those outside the community. Principles 
of subsidiarity and solidarity therefore suggest that the common good re-
quires regulation at a higher level of government-either with the state or 
federal government. 
b. Regulation at the State or Federal Level 
Would state governments be capable of engaging in regulating hazard-
ous waste in an efficient, cost-effective manner-and be likely to order de-
cision-making toward the common good (not just the good of all members 
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984. See Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments 
of 1984, supra note 25. Nonetheless, some local communities have stepped in with regulatory 
efforts. See George F. Gramling, III & William L. Earl, Cleaning Up After Federal and State 
Pollution Programs: Local Govel7ll11ent Hazardous Waste Regulation, 17 STETSON L. REv. 639 
(1988) (discussing a couple of local regulatory regimes, though the limited number of examples 
referenced in the article shows that such programs are exceptional). 
38. This assumes, for the moment, that we are not in a situation like that reflected in Henrik 
Ibsen's An Enemy of the People, in which the local government and community are more focused 
on economic gain than on environmental risks associated with a given industrial activity. HENRIK 
IBSEN, AN ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE (Robert Farquharson Sharp trans.) (1882), available at http:// 
www.gutenberg.org/etextl2446. 
39. For example, if a community were to pass regulations mandating the safe storage of 
hazardous wastes, such storage obligations would be beneficial for the local community as well as 
the broader community. Similarly, labeling requirements would give notice of risks or hazards not 
only to local residents, but also to the residents of surrounding communities through which materi-
als might be shipped. 
40. See Kirsten Engel, Reconsidering the National Market in Solid Waste: Trade-Offs in 
Equity, Efficiency, Environmental Protection, and State Autonomy, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1481, 
1495-1500 (1995) (discussing Supreme Court cases dealing with state prohibitions on importation 
of solid waste, discriminatory state surcharges and flow control laws). 
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of the state community)-or would regulation at the federal level ultimately 
be preferable? 
From the standpoint of resources needed to develop a complex regula-
tory regime, most state governments may have the capacity to develop reg-
ulations efficiently and cost-effectively that adequately address the risks 
associated with hazardous waste management. State governments certainly 
would be better situated in terms of resources than local governments. 
Would the common good be served, however, by having fifty states invest-
ing time and energy in developing their own regulatory regimes to manage 
hazardous wastes? Though state governments may have much greater ca-
pacity to develop legislative and regulatory regimes for managing hazard-
ous wastes than local governments, having state governments develop the 
legislative and regulatory regimes presents several potential problems such 
that principles of subsidiarity and solidarity suggest the common good 
probably would be better served by federal regulation. 
First, with fifty states trying to develop legislation and regulations, 
there likely would be some redundancy and duplication of effort as fifty 
different legislatures and agencies evaluate various industries and promul-
gate regulations to address hazardous waste management as it relates to 
various industrial processes and types of hazardous wastes.41 This potential 
redundancy and duplication of effort in developing standards and regula-
tions suggest that federal regulation makes more sense than state regulation. 
Second, while each of the fifty states has greater resources than local 
governments, the states nonetheless are burdened by limited resources that 
will require states to prioritize their efforts to develop regulatory regimes 
targeting various industries and types of hazardous wastes. Moreover, states 
have existing resource commitments that constrain development of new 
regulatory regimes to the extent that such new regimes might require reallo-
cation of resources from existing commitments or new resources. This 
likely will result in incomplete legislation and regulation in many, if not all, 
states as legislatures and regulatory agencies focus on industries and haz-
ardous wastes that appear to pose the greatest threats-leaving other indus-
tries and wastes possibly unregulated for some time.42 Although the 
41. See Stewart, supra note 16, at 1212; Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-
Setting: Is There a "Race" and is it "to the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS LJ. 271, 287-88 (1998). 
42. For example, CERCLA excludes petroleum products from the definition of hazardous 
substances. See supra note 33. RCRA focuses on solid and hazardous wastes. See supra notes 
21-22. Thus, neither CERCLA nor RCRA initially provided a viable means for regulating con-
tamination from underground storage tanks containing petroleum products. Nonetheless, the states 
failed to take the initiative to develop regulatory programs that encompassed these tanks, leaving 
it to Congress to mandate the development of a federal regulatory regime for underground storage 
tanks. The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, Title VI, 98 
Stat. 3221 (1984), amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-499, Title n, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). Similarly, the fact that Congress felt compelled to 
direct the EPA to develop criteria for state solid waste landfills that receive household hazardous 
waste further manifests the idea that the states have not taken sufficient initiative to protect the 
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problem of limited resources also impacts the federal government, the fed-
eral government's greater resources (and greater comfort functioning with a 
budget deficit)43 would make the federal government the more appropriate 
location for regulation. 
Third, states might develop inconsistent regulatory regimes, creating a 
patchwork system of regulations that could significantly impair national 
commerce in hazardous waste management.44 For example, if one state re-
quires labeling of one kind and another state requires a different kind of 
labeling, then generators and transporters of hazardous wastes might face 
significant costs to comply with these multiple inconsistent systems when 
commerce or waste crosses state lines. 
Fourth, an additional risk associated with state regulation is the "race 
to the bottom" problem in which states, as entities competing for industrial 
investment, may be tempted to "under-regulate" to obtain a competitive ad-
vantage or remain competitive with other states.45 Under principles of sub-
common good of their citizens-let alone citizens outside their states. See Hazardous and Solid 
Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 302, 98 Stat. 3221, 3627-28 (1984) (codified 
in part at 42 U.S.C. § 6949(a» (discussed supra note 25 and accompanying text). 
43. Some states, such as Missouri, have a state constitutional mandate regarding the imple-
mentation of a balanced budget that largely precludes deficit spending by the state. See Donald B. 
Tobin, The Balanced Budget Amendment: Will Judges Become Accountants? A Look at State 
Experiences, 12 J.L. & POL. 153, 155 (1996) (stating that forty-eight states have some type of 
balanced-budget provision). 
44. See Stewart, supra note 16, at 1211-12; Engel, supra note 41, at 287-88. Indeed, concern 
for inconsistent automobile emission regulations from different states prompted Congress to enact 
section 209 of the Clean Air Act, preempting all state regulation of vehicle emissions with the 
exception of California's vehicle emissions regulations (which Congress then allowed other states 
to adopt in section 177).42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7507,7543 (West 2008). 
45. The "race to the bottom" rationale is premised on the theory that individually rational 
decisions by states might be collectively irrational. If each state opts to regulate at a level lower 
than it might otherwise be inclined to regulate at because it is concerned with the competitive 
disadvantage it will face when compared with other states who have a less robust regulatory 
structure, the states will collectively opt for a lower level of regulation (and less protection "for 
all") than would be expected if states were acting in the absence of these competitive pressures. 
There is extensive literature on the validity of the "race to the bottom" premise. Richard 
Stewart initially posited the "race to the bottom" rationale, Stewart, supra note 16, which was 
largely accepted by scholars and commentators until Richard L. Revesz challenged the theory in 
his seminal article, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" 
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, supra note 16 (finding the "race to the bottom" 
argument unsupported and federal intervention inappropriate). A number of scholars have opined 
on both sides of this issue. Compare James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental 
Standards in a Federal System-and Why it Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226, 1236-37 (1995) 
(supporting Revesz's critique of the "race to the bottom" rationale for ,federal regulation), with 
Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United 
States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 781 n.88 (1995), and William W. Buzbee, Remembering 
Repose: Voluntary Contamination Cleanup Approvals, Incentives, and the Costs of Interminable 
Liability, 80 MINN. L. REv. 35, 110-15 (1995), and Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazard-
ous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. REv. 1516, 1533 n.64 (1995). 
A number of states have demonstrated that the "race to the bottom" problem may be less of a 
concern than it may seem-given that some states have implemented regulatory regimes that 
clearly are more rigorous than national standards or standards of surrounding states. A recent 
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sidiarity and solidarity, a "race to the bottom" incentive would function 
such that the "common good" is clearly not well-served. 
Fifth, states are not inherently less likely to act out of self-interest than 
local governments, individuals or businesses. For example, states may be 
inclined to engage in regulation excluding certain activities that impose sig-
nificant risk, such as excluding the treatment, storage or disposal of hazard-
ous wastes within state boundaries-something that would result in external 
costs for other states that may end up hosting a disproportionate number of 
hazardous waste disposal sites.46 The incentive toward serving the self-in-
terest of the states is likely to be contrary to serving the common good. 
All of these reasons suggest that Congress and the federal Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) are better situated than local or state gov-
ernments as the locus of legislation and regulation of hazardous wastes,47 
given the federal government's greater resources and the greater inclination 
Congress and the EPA have to legislate and regulate for the "good of all," 
rather than for the good of some parochial interests.48 
example of this is the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. See Jamison Colburn, Solidarity 
and Subsidiarity in a Changing Climate: Green Building as Legal and Moral Obligations, 5 U. 
ST. THOMAS. LJ. 232 (2008). The fact that some states now operate in a manner contrary to what 
would be expected in a "race to the bottom" analysis, however, does not negate the reality that 
states were failing to aggressively address environmental regulation in the late 1960s and early 
1970s-or even the 1980s, when Congress intervened by enacting a slew of federal environmental 
regulatory regimes. There is no dispute that in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s the states were not 
engaged in a "race to regulate" the environment that could be understood to serve the "common 
good." See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing absence of state regulation of under-
ground storage tanks, prompting federal regulation in the 1980s). 
46. See Engel, supra note 40. 
47. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (highlighting that even with respect to solid 
waste landfills and underground storage tanks, Congress and the EPA felt it necessary to take the 
initiative to develop federal criteria (for landfills) and a federal regulatory regime (for under-
ground storage tanks). 
48. Nonetheless, federal regulation is not a panacea. Legislation and regulation at the federal 
government level presents some problems that may impair the federal government's ability to 
function in a manner truly directed toward serving the common good. For example, the federal 
government may be slightly more subject to regulatory capture than state or local governments. 
The flip-side of the economic efficiency that comes with centralized federal regulation is the 
increased possibility of regulatory capture resulting from the centralized decision-making context. 
Conducting negotiations regarding legislation or regulation in fifty different states would make it 
difficult and expensive for any industrial group to develop sufficient relationships in each of those 
states to have a significant voice in how the legislative scheme or regulatory regime gets promul-
gated and implemented. At the federal level, however, an industrial group (particularly industrial 
groups with a more national presence) may have a greater voice than local entities, which will 
have to work through the challenges of "collective action" in order to have a more meaningful 
voice at the national level. For a discussion on regulatory capture, see Steve P. Calandrillo, Re-
sponsible Regulation: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk Versus Risk Approach to Federal Health and 
Safety Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REv. 957, 975-76 (2001) (citing George J. Stigler, The Theory of 
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971)). 
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3. Evaluating the RCRA Regulatory Regime Using Principles of 
Subsidiarity 
275 
While implementation of RCRA at the federal level conforms to the 
principles of subsidiarity and solidarity, to what extent does the actual im-
plementation of RCRA in fact integrate the principles of subsidiarity? 
While Congress and the EPA have developed a system of national standards 
for regUlating generators of hazardous wastes,49 transporters,50 and treat-
ment, storage and disposal facilities,51 there are two significant respects in 
which RCRA reflects principles of subsidiarity: the regulation of wastes 
rather than manufacturing processes, and allowing state implementations of 
RCRA. 
a. Regulation of Businesses as Generators, Not as 
Manufacturers 
Congress enacted a regulatory regime in RCRA that focuses on 
"wastes"-by-products of the manufacturing process-rather than on the 
manufacturing process that generates the wastes.52 Though RCRA was en-
acted when much of the regulatory mindset could be described as a "com-
mand and control" philosophy, the regulatory regime Congress and the EPA 
adopted does not dictate to industries or individual companies how to man-
ufacture their products.53 Rather, the regulatory regime promotes cost inter-
nalization by informing companies of the specific obligations with which 
they need to comply if they generate hazardous wastes.54 The regulated 
entities are left with the decision of which manufacturing processes to em-
ploy and the extent to which those processes generate hazardous wastes.55 
Thus, companies are able to assess costs and determine for themselves 
whether adopting a different manufacturing process (which may generate 
less hazardous waste) is, in fact, more cost effective given the consequences 
of the alternative manufacturing process.56 
Thus, although Congress and the EPA established at the federal level 
the standards by which generators of hazardous waste need to manage the 
transportation, treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous wastes-a sys-
tem for promoting cost-internalization by those generating hazardous 
49. 42 U.S.C. § 6922 (2000); 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.10-262.108 (2008). 
50. 42 U.S.C. § 6923 (2000); 40 C.F.R. §§ 263.10-263.31 (2008). 
51. 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (2000); 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.10-264.1202 (2008). 
52. J. Steven Whisler et aI., Turning Gold into "Solid Waste"; RCRA's Intrusion into the 
Industrial Process, 23 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 555, 562 (1991) (quoting legislative history to highlight 
Congress's intent to have the EPA refrain from intruding into the manufacturing process). 
53. Id. 
54. See Background and Theory of Hazardous Waste Control, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1465, 1478 
(1986). 
55. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
56. For example, the alternative manufacturing process may be more costly in terms of raw 
materials, capital equipment or reduced quality of the product. 
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wastes-Congress and the EPA embraced the principle of subsidiarity by 
leaving in the hands of those businesses generating the hazardous wastes 
the decision-making responsibility for choosing whether to employ manu-
facturing processes that result in the generation of hazardous wastes. 
b. State Implementation of the RCRA Regulatory Regime 
While Congress and the EPA developed the RCRA regulatory regime, 
Congress specifically recognized that there could be value in having the 
states implement and manage the RCRA regulatory regime.57 RCRA's stat-
utory enactment provides individual states with the ability to claim respon-
sibility for implementing and managing the RCRA regulatory regime within 
each state's borders if they enact a legislative and regulatory structure that 
is consistent with the RCRA federal regulatory regime. 58 Whether Congress 
was motivated by the desire to minimize federal implementation costs or by 
principles of subsidiarity in having states take over responsibility for man-
aging the RCRA regulatory regime, the reality is that Congress did enact a 
statutory regime that delegates some responsibility to the state level. Thus, 
Congress integrated principles of subsidiarity in the implementation regime 
it created for RCRA. 
Through limitations of the delegation of power to the state level, Con-
gress addressed some of the problems of state regulations while allowing 
the benefits of state regulation to be realized. The requirement that states 
conform to the federal regime negates some of the risks of a "race to the 
bottom" problem and counters incentives of exclusionary regulation that 
shifts risks of hazardous waste management to those outside of a given 
state. The delegation of power gives the states-those closer to the local 
risks associated with hazardous waste management-the opportunity to 
manage how the RCRA regulatory regime is implemented within their bor-
ders. This has resulted over the last few decades in the empowerment of 
states to be responsible for environmental regulation; states have increas-
ingly developed experienced personnel to address and manage environmen-
tal regulation and have become more proactive in developing their own 
regulatory regimes.59 
57. 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (2000) (providing a mechanism for states to administer and enforce 
hazardous waste program under RCRA); 42 U.S.C.A. § 6991c (West 2008) (providing a mecha-
nism for states to administer and enforce underground storage tank regulations under RCRA). 
58. 42 U.S.C. § 6926. As of 2000, over ninety percent of the states had fully or partially 
approved programs for administering and enforcing RCRA. The Environmental Council of the 
States (ECOS) maintains a list of approved state programs under RCRA (and other environmental 
statutes) on its website, ECOS, State Delegation-RCRA, http://www.ecos.org/section/states/en-
viro_actlistlrcra (last visited Mar. 20, 2008). 
59. Between 1986 and 1994, state environmental expenditures increased by fifty percent-
from $8.7 billion to $13.19 billion, ECOS, Spending, http://www.ecos.org/section/states/spending 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2008), much of it focused on increased staff. States thus have much greater 
capacity now to manage regulation of hazardous waste than was the case in the 1970s or early 
1980s. 
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Along with the locus of regulation of hazardous wastes, it is equally 
important to consider the locus of enforcement of hazardous waste regula-
tions. While Congress provided for delegation to the states of the responsi-
bility for implementing RCRA within their borders, it did not hand over 
complete responsibility for the enforcement of RCRA.60 Under RCRA, the 
EPA can take back the delegation of authority to any given state. RCRA has 
also been interpreted to allow the EPA to "overfile" -to take enforcement 
action in addition to that taken by a state with delegated authority.61 
These powers seem inconsistent with the principles of subsidiarity re-
flected in the state delegation doctrine. To be consistent, there would have 
to be justifiable reasons why Congress might want to preserve federal en-
forcement authority to assure that RCRA serves the common good in a way 
that might not happen if the states had full implementation and enforcement 
responsibilities. The primary justification for the EPA to retain the opportu-
nity to overfile is the concern about "sweetheart" deals that result in incon-
sistent enforcement across different states.62 However, is this really a 
legitimate concern? If a state has pursued an enforcement approach viewed 
as unnecessarily lenient-more of a compliance orientation than a punish-
ment orientation-does this really result in a problem in terms of harming 
the common good? 
Except in relatively rare cases (for example, a facility very near a state 
line), the environmental risks posed by a regulated entity's inappropriate 
conduct on its property are not likely to extend beyond the state boundary.63 
Thus, the state accounts for all relevant interests-the environmental harms 
or risks to the citizens of the state and the economic benefits associated with 
the regulated entities-and is therefore best situated to make a determina-
tion regarding whether and how to pursue enforcement action. While the 
federal government might be concerned about an enforcement-oriented 
"race to the bottom" in which states compete to be increasingly lenient in 
enforcement, this concern seems to be a very tenuous assertion (and can be 
ameliorated by withdrawing delegation of authority to a state program that 
the EPA feels is truly deficient). 64 
60. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (ZOOO) (discussing withdrawal of state authorization); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6928(a)(2) (2000) (discussing federal enforcement in states with authorized programs). 
61. Compare Wyckoff Co. v. E.P.A., 796 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding that Con-
gress did not intend to preempt federal regulation entirely in states with authorized programs), 
with Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999) (concluding that EPA could 
not "overfile" in states with authorized programs under RCRA where the state had taken enforce-
ment action). 
62. See Jerry Organ, Environmental Federalism Part I: The History of Overfiling Under 
RCRA, the CWA, and the CAA Prior to Harmon, Smithfield and CLEAN, 30 ENvTL. L. REp. 
10615, 10616 (ZOOO). 
63. To the extent that a regulated entity mismanages transportation of hazardous wastes 
across state lines, it subjects itself to the jurisdiction of each state through which its hazardous 
waste travels. Thus, the primary context in which enforcement is at issue is a local context. 
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 69Z6(e) (ZOOO). 
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While RCRA imposes some limitations on state enforcement, it also 
embraces a truly local enforcement option by providing for citizen suits-
actions by private individuals when the state or federal government has 
failed to bring an enforcement action against an alleged violator following 
notice of the potential citizen suit. 65 Thus, RCRA appears somewhat incon-
sistent with respect to subsidiarity in terms of enforcement; it recognizes 
some local control (in the form of citizen suits and state enforcement in 
states with delegated authority) while retaining enforcement authority for 
the EPA when the EPA thinks the state has not adequately addressed a 
matter. 
B. Application to CERCLA 
This section begins with a discussion of whether the principles of sub-
sidiarity, solidarity and the common good require governmental interven-
tion to address remediation of historical contamination from hazardous 
substances. Next, this section focuses on the extent to which the principles 
of subsidiarity and solidarity suggest that local, state or federal regulation 
seems more appropriate for addressing remediation of historical contamina-
tion of hazardous substances. Finally, the section evaluates the regulatory 
regime of CERCLA 66 through the lenses of subsidiarity and solidarity. 
1. Justification for Regulation 
In determining whether government intervention is necessary from the 
perspective of principles of subsidiarity and solidarity, the first question is 
whether individuals and businesses who have been responsible for contami-
nation resulting from the disposal of hazardous substances can be trusted to 
remediate the contamination in a manner consistent with the principles of 
solidarity and of promoting the common good. As the RCRA section con-
cluded, the track record of many individuals and businesses around the 
country suggests that they cannot be trusted to manage wastes in a manner 
consistent with principles of solidarity and promoting the common good.67 
Thus, the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity direct some type of regu-
65. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2000). 
66. 42 U.S.CA §§ 9601-9675 (West 2008). 
67. See supra note 24 (discussing Congressional justification for enacting RCRA and CER-
CLA). Businesses and individuals that disposed of hazardous substances on the property of others 
certainly have not shown an inclination to invest in remediation of the property of others. Even 
businesses and individuals that disposed of hazardous substances on their own property, however, 
frequently have not shown great initiative in remediating their contaminated property (as evi-
denced by the significant inventory of contaminated sites developed through the state responses to 
the inventory requirements set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (2000)). Over 46,000 sites were identi-
fied as part of the CERCLIS database as of 1995, although roughly 34,000 of them were 
"archived" (indicating no need for further federal governmental action) as of 1996. See EPA, 
Round 2-4c: Refining CERCLIS, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/reforms/reforms/2-
4c.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2008). 
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lation. As some government intervention is necessary for this area, the next 
question is at which level of government should regulation be imple-
mented-the local, state or federal government? 
2. Assessing the Appropriate Locus of Regulation 
a. Regulation at the Local Level 
With respect to the responsibility to respond retroactively to contami-
nation problems caused by individuals and businesses that disposed of haz-
ardous substances, would local governments be capable of engaging in the 
regulatory activity in an efficient, cost-effective manner-and be likely to 
order decision-making toward the common good? Like the conclusion 
reached with RCRA, the complex nature of some of the contamination 
problems resulting from disposal of hazardous substances-and the reality 
that these problems have largely gone undetected or unaddressed for many 
years-makes it appear that local governments are not (or certainly were 
not) well-equipped to address these problems.68 
h. Regulation at the State or Federal Level 
Would state governments be capable of addressing historical contami-
nation problems resulting from the disposal of hazardous substances in a 
manner that orders decision-making toward the common good, or is the 
federal level preferable? 
From the standpoint of resources needed to develop a complex regula-
tory regime, most state governments may have the capacity to develop reg-
ulations efficiently and cost-effectively that adequately address the 
remediation associated with contamination from disposal of hazardous sub-
stances. State governments certainly would be better situated for remedia-
tion than local governments given the risk of redundancy involved if each 
city or county had to develop its own system. Further, state governments' 
orientation toward remediation is likely to be consistent with principles of 
subsidiarity and solidarity such that the common good might be equally as 
well served by state efforts as it would be by federal efforts. Would the 
common good be served, however, by having fifty states investing time and 
energy in developing their own regulatory regimes to deal with contamina-
tion resulting from disposal of hazardous substances, rather than having the 
federal government develop a regulatory regime? 
First, in contrast with RCRA's prospective regulation of hazardous 
wastes being generated from a wide variety of manufacturing processes, 
which requires an equally wide array of regulatory strategies, the develop-
ment of remediation protocols under CERCLA for contamination from haz-
ardous substances only involves the development of one general set of 
68. See id. 
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processes for investigating sites, identifying remediation options, selecting 
an appropriate remediation plan and implementing the selected remediation 
option.69 This regulatory regime is less likely to result in unnecessary re-
dundancy and duplication of effort. There might be some efficiencies from 
having the federal government define one general process applicable to all 
states, but the "process" described above involves far less complexity than 
appears with RCRA's regulation of the wide array of hazardous wastes gen-
erated from myriad manufacturing processes. The fifty states will also have 
far fewer redundancy inefficiencies than would be the case with thousands 
of cities or counties developing their own regimes. 
Second, while each of the fifty states has greater resources than local 
governments, the states nonetheless are burdened by limited resources,7° 
which will require states to prioritize their efforts to focus on some contam-
ination sites before others. The federal government, however, would also 
have to prioritize to best use limited resources, and, given the risk to citi-
zens of the states, arguably the states are better situated than the federal 
government to figure out which sites within their state boundaries present 
the highest priority for remediation. 
Third, while states might decide to impose different remediation stan-
dards for similar types of contamination problems, it is not at all clear that 
having uniform national standards for remediation is truly necessary. While 
businesses with mUltiple manufacturing facilities in multiple states might be 
very interested in having one set of uniform regulations applicable to all of 
their manufacturing facilities, with respect to cleaning up historical contam-
ination there is not necessarily any efficiency associated with uniform 
remediation standards across differing states. 
Fourth, as with RCRA, the "race to the bottom" problem could impact 
state regulation of contaminated sites as states may be tempted to "under-
regulate" to obtain a competitive advantage or to remain competitive with 
other states.71 Under principles of subsidiarity and solidarity, even with 
some capacity and efficiency factors favoring state regulation, the "race to 
the bottom" dilemma will function such that the common good may not be 
well-served in the absence of some federal regulatory intervention.72 The 
69. Unlike the RCRA situation, in which states would need to develop standards for a wide 
variety of entities subject to regulation as generators, the regulatory regime for dealing with con-
taminated sites is largely uniform in nature and embraces basic principles of problem-solving-
investigate the scope of the problem, evaluate options for addressing the problem and then select 
and implement a remediation plan from among the identified options. See infra notes 80-89 and 
accompanying text (describing the investigation and remediation process set forth in CERCLA 
and the National Contingency Plan). 
70. See supra note 43. 
71. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
72. This would be a situation in which individually rational decisions by states might be 
collectively irrational. If each state opts to require remediation at a less stringent level than it 
might otherwise be inclined to impose because it is concerned about the competitive disadvantage 
it will face compared with other states that have a less robust remediation structure, then the states 
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regulatory advantages conferred by states, however, may not be any greater 
than corporate income tax benefits or other common forms of corporate 
welfare. 
In sum, these reasons suggest that Congress and the EPA are not nec-
essarily better situated than state governments as the locus of legislation and 
regulations addressing the remediation of contamination caused by the dis-
posal of hazardous substances, although the relative lack of state initiative 
on these matters prior to the enactment of CERCLA (and even subsequent 
to the enactment of CERCLA), as well as "race to the bottom" concerns, 
would suggest that some federal-level intervention, such as CERCLA, may 
have been appropriate. 
3. Evaluating the CERCLA Regulatory Regime Using Principles of 
Subsidiarity and Solidarity 
The next question concerns the extent to which CERCLA and the reg-
ulatory regime developed by the EPA embrace principles of subsidiarity 
and solidarity directed toward promoting the common good. 
a. Evaluation of CERCLA with Respect to NPL Sites 
CERCLA's enactment called for the creation of an inventory of sites 
where hazardous substances had been disposed73 and a prioritization of 
those sites such that those most in need of remediation would be placed on 
the National Priorities List (NPL).74 NPL sites came to be known as 
"Superfund" sites 75 because CERCLA authorized the generation of reve-
collectively will opt for a less stringent level of remediation (and less protection "for all") than 
would be expected if states were acting in the absence of these competitive pressures. The states 
certainly were not aggressively addressing environmental remediation in the late 1970s and early 
1980s when Congress intervened with the enactments of RCRA and CERCLA and then with the 
amendments to RCRA (Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984) which brought in regu-
lation of underground storage tanks and required federal criteria for solid waste landfills receiving 
household hazardous waste. See supra notes 25, 42 and accompanying text. 
73. 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (2000). There were over 25,000 potentially hazardous waste sites de-
veloped in the initial response to the CERCLA notification provision according to the EPA. See 
Supelfund: Looking Back, Looking Ahead, 13 E.P.A. J. 12, 17 (1987). More recent estimates place 
the number of sites in excess of 45,000. See supra note 45. 
74. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9605(a)(8)(B) (West 2008) contains the reference to a list of national 
priority sites that ultimately became the National Priorities List (NPL) in the Code of Federal 
Regulations. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.5 (2008). The NPL presently contains 1,245 sites, with 324 
deleted from the list and 61 sites proposed for listing. EPA, National Priorities List (NPL): NPL 
Site Totals by Status and Milestone, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/query/queryhtm/ 
npltotaJ.htm (NPL data last updated Mar. 19, 2008). 
75. Congress provided for the creation of the "Hazardous Substance Superfund" (Superfund) 
within the EPA's implementation of CERCLA. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act of 1980(CERCLA), Pub. 1. No. 96-510, § 221, 94 Stat. 2767, 
2801-802 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (2000)). 
Congress created the Superfund to pay for a variety of costs associated with implementing 
CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (2000). The Superfund initially was funded by various taxes, 
including taxes on chemical feedstocks, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
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nues from taxes on the chemical and petroleum industries, which were to be 
placed into a fund to pay for the costs of cleaning up these "Superfund" 
sites, until such time as the government could recover its costs from PRPs 
through cost recovery actions.76 Thus, the most notable universe of CER-
CLA sites is the set of Superfund sites-those sites placed on the NPL 
based on an evaluation of the risk presented by the sites.77 Between one 
thousand and two thousand sites have been added to the NPL over the last 
three decades, while tens of thousands of other sites remain outside the NPL 
process.78 Notably, the EPA is supposed to consult with states in making 
listing decisions for placement on the NPL, so to some extent CERCLA 
gave states a voice in identifying sites for priority remediation.79 
With respect to those sites that make it onto the NPL, CERCLA con-
templates a remediation process driven by the federal government, not by 
the owner or operator of the site and not by the state government. 80 At 
and Liability Act § 211(a), 94 Stat. at 2798-99 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 4661 (2000», 
taxes on crude oil and petroleum products, § 211(a), 94 Stat. at 2797-98 (codified as amended at 
26 U.S.C. § 4611 (2000», taxes on imported chemical derivatives, § 515(a), 94 Stat. at 1767 
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 4671 (2000», and a corporate environmental income tax, 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 516(a), 
100 Stat. 1613, 1770 (amended 1988) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.c. § 59A (2000»; see also 
26 U.S.C. § 9507(b)(1) (2000). 
In addition, the Superfund receives all recoveries from PRPs, all penalties paid by PRPs, all 
punitive damages recovered under section 107(c)(3) of CERCLA, and "all moneys recovered or 
collected under section 311(b)(6)(B) of the Clean Water Act." See 26 U.S.C. § 9507(b)(2)-(5) 
(1988). 
After initially appropriating $1.6 billion dollars to the Superfund when it enacted CERCLA 
in 1980, Congress appropriated $8.5 billion in 1986 for the five-year reauthorization period. See 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 111, 
100 Stat. 1613, 1642-46 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (2000»; H.R. REp. No. 962, at 318,321 
(1986) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3411, 3414 (1986). In 1990, when 
Congress reauthorized CERCLA through September 30, 1994, it also extended the Superfund 
through December 31, 1995, expecting to raise approximately $5 billion in taxes through 1995. 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11231, 104 Stat. 1388. 
Congress did not reauthorize the Superfund taxes after 1995, and the Superfund Trust Fund 
ran out of money in 2004. Since 1995, the Superfund program has increasingly relied on general 
fund appropriations as the trust fund balance dwindled. Virginia Natural Resources Leadership 
Institute, Superfund and Brownfield Reclamation: Revitalizing and Reusing Contaminated Lands, 
http://www.virginia.edu/ienlvnrli/docs/briefs/superfund%202006.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2008). 
76. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607 (West 2008). See Organ, supra note 24, at 1047-53 (describing 
CERCLA's liability and cost-recovery regime). 
77. The risk at sites was assessed using the Hazard Ranking System. Hazard Ranking Sys-
tem, 55 Fed. Reg. 51532 (Dec. 14, 1990) (codified at 40 C.P.R. pt. 300). A description of the 
Hazard Ranking System can be found on the EPA's website. EPA, Superfund: Introduction to the 
Hazard Ranking System (HRS), http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/npl_hrslhrsint.htrn (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2008). 
78. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
79. The EPA issued a memorandum in 1996 regarding "Coordination with the States on 
National Priority List Decisions." Memorandum from Elliot P. Laws, Assistant Administrator, 
EPA Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response (Nov. 14, 1996), http://www.epa.gov/ 
superfund/sites/npl/hrsres/policy/govlet.pdf. 
80. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9605 (West 2008). The NCP regulations are set forth at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
300. 
2008] LENSES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 283 
Congress's direction, the EPA promulgated a "national contingency plan" 
(NCP) setting forth a detailed process for assessing the actual risks at a site 
(Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study),81 evaluating potential reme-
dial options and selecting from among those options (Record of Deci-
sion),82 and· implementing the remedial plan (Remedial Design and 
Remedial Action). 83 
Following the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act in 
1986,84 Congress set forth specific standards for remedy selection prefer-
encing compliance with all applicable, relevant and appropriate require-
ments85 and preferencing permanent remedies.86 While the Superfund 
process allowed for states to participate in decision-making and serve as the 
lead agency,87 the EPA generally maintained final decision-making author-
ity.88 Although the process also called for community relations plans to 
81. 40 C.P.R. § 300.430(d) (2008) (describing the Remedial Investigation and Feasibility 
Study (RIfFS) stage). During the remedial investigation (RI) stage, information "necessary to ade-
quately characterize the site for the purpose of developing and evaluating effective remedial alter-
natives" is collected. § 300.430(d)(1), (e). The feasibility study (FS) is designed to "ensure that 
appropriate remedial alternatives are developed and evaluated such that relevant information con-
cerning the remedial action options can be presented to a decision-maker and an appropriate rem-
edy selected." § 300.430(e)(1). When screening the remedial alternatives, the short- and long-term 
aspects of the alternatives' effectiveness, implementability, and costs are considered. See 
§ 300.430(e)(7). The EPA screens and evaluates the alternatives based on nine criteria: (1) pro-
tecting human health and the environment; (2) complying with applicable, relevant, and appropri-
ate requirements (ARARs); (3) long-term effectiveness and permanence; (4) reduction of toxicity, 
mobility, or volume through treatment; (5) short-term effectiveness; (6) implementability; (7) 
cost; (8) state acceptance; and (9) local acceptance. § 300.430 (e)(9). 
82. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f) (2008). The selection of an appropriate remedy requires applica-
tion of the criteria set forth in supra note 81. Those alternatives that satisfy the first two "thresh-
old" criteria are assessed based on the next five "balancing" criteria, with the final two criteria 
used as modifying factors. § 300.430(f)(1)(i). The selection involves a two-step process. 
§ 300.430(f)(1)(ii). "First, the lead agency, in conjunction with the support agency, identifies a 
preferred alternative and presents it to the public" for review and comment. § 300.430(f)(I)(ii). 
Second, the lead agency reviews the public comments and consults with the state (or support 
agency) "to determine if the alternative remains the most appropriate remedial action for the site 
or site problem." § 300.430(f)(l)(ii). In support of its selection, the agency records "all facts, 
analyses of facts, and site-specific policy determinations considered .... " § 300.430(f)(5). 
83. 40 C.F.R. § 300.435 (2008). During the Remedial Design and Remedial Action (RD/RA) 
stage the actual design of the selected remedy is developed and then implemented. Id. 
§ 300.435(a). 
84. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 
100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 2008) and scattered 
sections of Titles 10, 16, 29, and 33 U.S.C.). 
85. 42 U.S.c. § 9621(d)(1)-(2) (2000). 
86. 42 U.S.c. § 9621(b)(1) ("Remedial actions in which treatment which permanently and 
significantly reduces the volume, toxicity or mobility of the hazardous substances, pollutants, ... 
are to be preferred over remedial actions not involving such treatment."). 
87. 42 U.S.c. § 9621(f). Section 9621(f)(l) provides that "[tJhe President shall promulgate 
regulations providing for substantial and meaningful involvement by each State in initiation, de-
velopment, and selection of remedial actions to be undertaken in that State." States are authorized 
to serve as lead agency in investigating and remediating sites. 40 C.F.R. § 300.515(a) (2008). 
88. The regulations make it clear that the federal government will have the ultimate say in 
remedy-selection. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.515(e)(2) (providing that state conCUlTence in a Record of 
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allow dissemination of relevant information to the local community, the 
EPA generally retained final decision-making authority.89 
Thus, even if the relevant landowners, the local community and a 
state-those most directly, and to some extent exclusively, impacted by a 
contamination problem-felt that a reduced scope of remediation was ap-
propriate because the investment in additional remediation far exceeded the 
value of further reduction in risks, the EPA generally is bound by the provi-
sions of the NCP to mandate a more extensive (and more expensive) reme-
dial option.90 Given that virtually all of the risks associated with Superfund 
sites are local in nature and could be well understood by the landowners and 
the local and state governments, it is hard to reconcile the Superfund pro-
cess with the principle of subsidiarity and solidarity, i.e., given that these 
sites generally do not present an interstate "lack of solidarity" concern be-
cause the risk of harm is localized.91 
b. Evaluation of CERCLA with Respect to Non-NPL Sites 
With respect to non-Superfund sites, the federal government generally 
is not directly involved in the remediation decisions, which generally are 
left to the property owners in conjunction with local or state government. 92 
Thus, at first blush, CERCLA would appear to function more consistently 
Decision is not a prerequisite to EPA's selection of a remedy, and providing that a state may not 
proceed with a remedy at a state-lead site that is fund-financed without the concurrence of the 
EPA, although acknowledging that in state-lead sites that are not financed under Superfund, the 
state may select a remedy without the approval of the EPA). 
89. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.155 (2008) (discussing public information and community relations 
generally), § 300.415(n) (2008) (discussing community relations plans in relation to removal ac-
tions), § 300.430(c) (2008) (discussing community relations in the context of the RIlFS process), 
§ 300.435(c) (2008) (discussing community relations in the context of the RDIRA process); but 
see supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing final decision-making authority). 
90. A landowner may be interested in a faster and cheaper remediation process and the 
neighboring landowners and the community also may want a faster remediation process and may 
be willing to accept the marginally greater risks (or look at alternatives to remediation-such as 
institutional controls-for addressing such risks). Regardless, the EPA has little flexibility in the 
remedy-selection process following the enactment of SARA. EPA has embarked on a variety of 
Superfund reforms over the last decade or so that try to address in some ways the need to be more 
conscious of cost concerns and the concerns of the local communities. See EPA, Office of Emer-
gency and Remedial Support, The Role of Cost in the Superfund Remedy Selection Process (Sept. 
1996), http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/cosCdir/cosCdir.pdf; EPA, Superfund Reforms: Re-
forms By Type - Cleanups, http://www.epa.gov/superfundlprograms/reforms/types/cleanup.htm 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2008) (listing of the reforms focused on the remedy-selection process). 
91. In a 1995 report entitled "How to Rescue Superfund: Bringing Common Sense to the 
Process," the Heritage Foundation highlighted that Superfund involves local problems and that 
decision-making regarding such problems should be left with local authorities rather than the 
federal government. John Shanahan, Heritage Foundation, How TO RESCUE SUPERFUND: BRING-
ING COMMON SENSE TO THE PROCESS (July 31, 1995), http://www.heritage.orgiResearch/Energy-
andEnvironmentlbgl 047 .cfm. 
92. 40 C.F.R. § 300.515(e)(2) specifically notes that with respect to non-NPL sites (non-
fund-financed sites) at which the state is the lead agency, the state need not get EPA approval of 
remedy selection decisions. 
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with principles of subsidiarity and solidarity with regard to non-NPL sites. 
Nonetheless, given the liability framework of CERCLA, in which non-gov-
ernmental entities can recover from PRPs only the necessary costs of 
remediation that are consistent with the NCP, the NCP casts a long shadow 
even over remediation at non-NPL sites.93 If a landowner or other party 
engaged in remediation wants to be able to recover remediation costs from 
PRPs, the party has to conduct the investigation and remediation in a man-
ner consistent with the NCP, which means that even at non-NPL sites the 
investigation and remediation must be done as if it were a NPL site at 
which the federal remediation standards are determinative.94 
c. Evaluation of CERCLA with Respect to Brownfields Reform 
Over time, Congress, the EPA and the states came to realize that a 
significant number of contaminated, largely urban industrial sites that were 
not on the NPL were lying fallow and under-utilized because of historical 
contamination and the significant potential cost of cleanup.95 In response to 
these concerns, the EPA developed a variety of reforms,96 and Congress 
ultimately took action in 2002 with the enactment of the Small Business 
93. Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (West 2008) PRPs shall be liable for "any other 
necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency 
plan." 
94. While the federal standards apply, the EPA generally will not have any direct involve-
ment in the remedy selection process-rather the landowner together with the state likely will be 
standing in the shoes of the EPA and trying to make the remedy selection decision in a manner 
consistent with the NCP. Notably, RCRA has two different programs that are somewhat compara-
ble to CERCLA in that they address remediation of historical contamination. These two programs 
are the Corrective Action program, which focuses on investigating and remediating solid waste 
management units at permitted treatment, storage and disposal facilities, 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u), (v) 
(2000); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h) (2000), and the Underground Storage Tank program, which focuses 
on investigating and remediating leaking underground storage tanks. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6991d (West 
2008),40 C.P.R. §§ 280.60-280.67 (2008). The Corrective Action program is much more consis-
tent with principles of subsidiarity than CERCLA in that the EPA offers much more flexibility 
with remedy selection under RCRA and is much more deferential to state decisions regarding 
remedy selection than is the case under CERCLA. See, e.g., 40 C.P.R. § 258.57 (2008) (states 
with delegated authority make remedy selection determinations on corrective action at municipal 
solid waste facilities). For a discussion of corrective action in RCRA and CERCLA, see Timothy 
O. Schimpf, Unleash RCRA! Letting Loose the Corrective Action Process of RCRA Can Change 
the World, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REV. 481 (2005) and Richard G. Stoll, The New 
RCRA Cleanup Regime: Comparisons and Contrasts with CERCLA, 44 Sw. LJ. 1299, 1310-12 
(1991). The remedy selection process with respect to remediation at sites with leaking under-
ground storage tanks similarly reflects greater consistency with principles of subsidiarity in that 
the remediation standards afford much greater flexibility than under CERCLA with much greater 
deference to state decisions. See generally 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.60-280.67. 
95. See Mark Reisch, ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS: SUPERFUND AND BROWNFIELDS IN THE 
107TH CONGRESS (June 5, 2002), http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/dataJ2002/upl-meta-crs-
31231IB 10078_2002Jun05.pdf.· 
96. For a summary of EPA initiatives relating to Brownfields and the revitalization of such 
properties, see EPA, Brownfields and Land Revitalization: Brownfields Liability, http:// 
www.epa.govlbrownfields/liab.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2008). 
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Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act (Brownfields Act).97 
With the enactment of the Brownfields Act, Congress reallocated to the 
states much greater authority (and limited the authority of the EPA) with 
respect to remedy-selection decisions and enforcement actions at non-NPL 
sites that qualify for Brownfields status. This change allowed greater use of 
institutional controls to address risk rather than always requiring 
remediation.98 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons noted above, RCRA's structure of having the federal 
government develop the regulatory regime for the prospective generation, 
transportation, treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous wastes would 
appear to be consistent with the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity 
ordered toward the common good. There is efficiency in having the federal 
government develop the regulatory standards for this area (without the re-
source constraints, redundancy and inconsistency of having fifty states de-
velop the standards and without the potential "race to the bottom" or 
exclusionary regulation problems). RCRA's design is also largely consis-
tent with the principles of subsidiarity, solidarity and the common good in 
that RCRA does not intrude into the manufacturing decisions of generators 
of hazardous wastes by mandating certain manufacturing processes, and 
RCRA authorizes the delegation of the regulatory regime to the vast major-
ity of states that choose to enact state legislative and regulatory regimes 
consistent with RCRA. The one sense in which RCRA is perhaps inconsis-
tent with principles of subsidiarity and solidarity relates to the EPA's au-
thority to "overfile'l-to take enforcement action even when a state with 
delegated authority already has taken enforcement action. 
While RCRA regulates an interstate hazardous waste market that truly 
is national in scope such that a uniform federal regulatory regime makes 
sense, CERCLA regulates a national problem (historical contamination) 
that has a largely local impact. Nonetheless, having a federal regulatory 
regime in place to facilitate remediation of some of the most seriously con-
taminated sites (those on the NPL) may be consistent with the principles of 
subsidiarity and solidarity ordered toward the common good given the lack 
of initiative the states had shown in trying to address these problems. The 
regime implemented under CERCLA, however, while encouraging the fed-
97. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 
107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002). 
98. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(39) (West 2008) (defining "Brownfield site"). For a short summary 
of the Brownfields Act, see EPA, Brownfields and Land Revitalization: Summary of the Small 
Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, http://www.epa.govlbrownfields/ 
html-doc/2869sum.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). Institutional controls include deed restrictions 
and other limitations on the use of property that can minimize risk, for example, by precluding the 
property from residential use. [d. 
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eral government to collaborate with states and facilitating states to "take the 
lead" in some investigations at NPL sites, leaves most significant remedy-
selection and enforcement decisions in the hands of the EPA. Even with 
non-NPL sites, where states have greater authority to investigate and take 
enforcement action, the liability structure of CERCLA largely minimizes 
the actual authority of local government or states to make remedy-selection 
decisions that are inconsistent with the mandates of the NCP. Only'with the 
recent reforms related to Brownfields have Congress and the EPA begun to 
take more concrete action to delegate to states and local actors greater au-
thority over remedy-selection and enforcement in a manner more consistent 
with the principles of subsidiarity, solidarity and the common good. 
Now more than three decades into the era of Environmental Law, there 
has been a significant reallocation of resources at the federal, state and local 
level to issues of environmental regulation. With this increase in re-
sources-both financial and human-states have developed an increased 
capacity to manage environmental concerns for which the federal govern-
ment felt obliged to take the initiative in the 1970s and 1980s (due to the 
absence of significant state action). The increased state capability can be 
seen in the implementation of RCRA and CERCLA. For example, a signifi-
cant number of states have delegated authority under RCRA and are taking 
the lead with respect to Brownfields under CERCLA. While this improve-
ment does not mean there will not be a need for federal initiatives as we 
identify future areas of environmental regulation, it does suggest that states 
will have a greater capacity to be the appropriate locus of regulation for a 
variety of environmental issues as we move into the twenty-first century. 
Thus, as the system of environmental regulation evolves, Congress, state 
legislatures, and state and federal administrative agencies should pay atten-
tion to the principles of subsidiarity, solidarity and the common good in 
assessing whether the local, state or federal government is the appropriate 
location for both the development and implementation of the next genera-
tion of environmental laws and regulations. 
